Third Army Objectives.
Source: [1] ARMY & NAVY JOURNAL, Jun 29 46, Gen. Eisenhower's Report, p. 1314. [2] Black Hawks over the Danube. The general situation along the Third Army front as of April 22 1945, saw the American line stretching generally from north of STUTTGART eastwardly through ANSBACH, NÜRNBERG, BAYREUTH, toward the junction with the First Army at LEIPZIG. On April 22, Third Army (Fig. I-1) swung around from its previous drive towards BERLIN and commenced its two-pronged attack towards the National Redoubt. One objective was to advance into Czechoslovakia to link up with the Russians and the other was to advance southward through the heart of Bavaria, to liquidate any plans to hold out in the Alps of southern Germany and Austria and to link up with the American Fifth Army coming up from Italy and with the Russians advancing westward through Austria. The thrust of the Third Army down the DANUBE VALLEY made rapid progress against a tottering enemy. Although the defenders held out at REGENSBURG until April 26, XX Corps established bridgeheads across the DANUBE east and west of the city on the 25th and then advanced southeast down the right bank while XII Corps did likewise north of the River. By May 2, the north bank had been cleared of the enemy as far as PASSAU, and the 11th Armd Div shot ahead to receive the surrender of LINZ on May 5. With this lengthening of the XII Corps line, the Third Army took command of V Corps, from the First Army, for operations into CZECHOSLOVAKIA on its northern flank. By an attack eastward across the frontier, PILSEN was captured on May 6. These operations were carried out in full coordination with the Russians approaching from the east. The American troops advanced to the line BUDEJOVICE-PILSEN-KARLSBAD ("Pilsen Line") halted while the Red Army cleared the east and west banks of the MOLDAU RIVER and occupied PRAGUE. South of Czechoslovakia, the agreed provisional line of junction ran down the BUDEJOVICE-LINZ railroad and thence along the Valley of the ENNS, where contact was affected on May 8. South of the DANUBE, XX Corps crossed the ISAR RIVER on April 29, at the same time clearing the north bank to the DANUBE confluence. On May 1, the corps reached the INN RIVER at BRAUNAU and proceeded to close that River in its sector. On its right flank, III Corps crossed the DANUBE in the INGOLSTADT area on April 26, and, advancing southeast, established bridgeheads over the ISAR on the 28th, in conformity with the Seventh Army offensive further west. On May 2, III Corps reached the INN at WASSERBURG, securing the MÜHLDORF bridges intact, after which the sector was taken over by the Seventh Army.

Source: [1] ARMY & NAVY JOURNAL, Jun 29 46, Gen. Eisenhower's Report, p. 1314. The conquest of the Redoubt area thus remained as an important objective of the Allies, despite the collapse of the rest of GERMANY. In the event of determined resistance, its reduction would constitute a formidable problem, and speed of movement was therefore essential to forestall the enemy's retiring into the area in time to fortify against the Allies' attacks. An advance was planned to subdivide the German forces in the south with the principal thrust conducted down the DANUBE VALLEY toward LINZ, Austria, with the objective of effecting a further junction with Russian forces. The static situation in central GERMANY (U.S. forces holding line on ELBE-MULDE), now permitted the use of Third U.S. Army for this purpose. (The 6th Army Group was to devote the whole of its attention to the problem of the Redoubt farther south and west.) Even when the DANUBE offensive had subdivided the enemy's forces in the south, it might still be possible for the Redoubt to hold out, and the Third Army was therefore instructed, in addition to its principal thrust, to seize SALZBURG. (The Seventh Army, under the 6th Army Group, was to advance along the axis WÜRZBURG-MÜNCHEN, penetrate the mountains, and subsequently to occupy the fortress area.)

Source: [1] ARMY & NAVY JOURNAL, Jun 29 46, Gen. Eisenhower's Report, p. 1313. Three main avenues lay before them by which they could thrust deeper into Germany .... The northern avenue, a route laying across the North German Plain toward the BALTIC and BERLIN, offered the following objectives: 1. Seizing BERLIN, the capitol of the German Reich, which would serve as a symbol of victory. 2. Cutting off the German forces to the north in northwest Germany, Holland, Denmark and Norway from the main enemy armies south of the line. 3. Capturing the northern German ports which would bring an end to the activities of the German U-boats. 4. Meeting up with the Russians who were sweeping across POMERANIA, north of BERLIN. The central avenue, a thrust from KASSEL, through ERFURT and LEIPZIG, to DRESDEN, promised a rapid advance through favorable terrain made all the easier due to a large gap in the enemy lines created by the trapping of ARMY GROUP B in the RUHR Pocket. Objectives for this advance would be: 1. Seizing the last important industrial area left to the Germans. 2. Cutting the Reich in half by linking hands with the advancing Russian forces. The southern avenue, represented by the axis of advance through NÜRNBERG and REGENSBURG and by the DANUBE Valley into Austria, offered the following objectives:
1. Linking up with the Russians in Austria.
2. Isolating, then penetrating, the National Redoubt.

On the southern flank of the central thrust, the Third Army, headed by XX Corps, encountered only scattered opposition, with little more than road blocks to bar its progress in the country north of the THURINGIAN Forest. WEIMAR was reached on April 11 and ERFURT cleared the next day, by the 13th JENA had been cleared and the 4th Armd Div was at the outskirts of CHEMNITZ. The enemy retired southeast into the ERZGEBIRGE along the frontier of Czechoslovakia, although the Germans still cling to the town of CHEMNITZ as a pivot to the north, where the south Saxon cities were putting up a stiff resistance to the First Army. At the same time that XX Corps was advancing to the north of Czechoslovakia, XII and VIII Corps of the Third Army, farther south, pushed through BAYREUTH and NEUSTADT toward the mountains of the BOHEMIAN Forest forming the southwestern border of the country. On April 18, the Allied armies set foot in Czechoslovakia.

Reorganizations and Reductions
The reduction of organizations in the Theater began immediately, and by July the Army Group formations had been eliminated. As early as May, the Seventh Army was absorbed into the 12th Army Gp. This and the withdrawal of the First French Army to the French Zone permitted the complete inactivation of the 6th Army Gp (GO #168, USFET, 21 Jun 45) on July 20 1945. On July 26, 12th Army Gp became non-operational, with the transfer to USFET of the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Fifteenth Armies. The personnel of HQ, Special Troops, 12th Army Gp, was assigned to HQ Command, USFET, on Aug 1 1945 (GO #306, USFET, 6 Nov 45).

Following the surrender the primary mission of the American troops was to support military government in its enforcement of the terms of surrender. This would be accompanied by * redeployment of excess troops from the theater (downsizing from over 3,000,000 to 400,00); * reduction of duties for the remaining troops; * development/transformation of the theater organization to a type more suitable for the performance of long-range occupation; * transfer of military government responsibilities from the military command to a civilian agency at the earliest possible moment.

Missions
Source: The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953.
Under the general supervision of the Posthostilities Planning Section of HQ SHAEF, posthostilities studies went on in various agencies and at various levels (by April 1944 seventy-two studies in progress). The most important study was a specific plan for administering the occupation that was to become known as Operation ECLIPSE.

ECLIPSE planning included such matters as:
(1) the terms of surrender;
(2) the application of sanctions;
(3) the disarmament and disbandment of the German armed forces;
(4) the disarmament and control of paramilitary organizations;
(5) the safeguarding and disposal of captured enemy materiel;
(6) the arrest and bringing to justice of war criminals;
(7) the control of transportation and communications;
(8) the disarmament and control of the police;
(9) the establishment of law and order;
(10) the control of governments and military organizations;
(11) the institution of military government;
(12) the execution of intelligence functions;
(13) the control of public information mediums;
(14) the liberation, care, and repatriation of prisoners of war of Allied nationality;
(15) the care and repatriation of displaced persons (DPs) of UN nationality.

ECLIPSE conditions were to be declared, and these plans put into effect, when active resistance ceased in any given area.

Present duties of troops in the European Theater engaged on the strictly military duties incident to occupation:
* demilitarization
* maintaining law and order turned over to local police forces that are supervised and reinforced by district constabulary organized opposition; serious crime
* border patrol two thousand miles of international and interzonal boundaries (other reports speak of less)
* guarding military and civilian installations military stores (depots), telephone exchanges, electrical plants, road and railroad bridges, and other points which might be targets of enemy sabotage
* denazification and pacification requires intelligence and counter-intelligence work
* training in occupational duties
* procurement, storage and distribution of supplies supplies for occupation troops; supplies for UNRRA and the Foreign Liquidation Commission
* providing communications construction of bridges, highways, waterways, signal communications facilities
* property disposal - U.S. government property property valued at more than $7,000,000,000 is being stored, guarded and maintained by troops of the European Theater; first phase consisted of roll-up and concentration of this material - storage and orderly destruction of captured enemy material (100 depots and dumps are in operation for storage of material captured from the enemy)

This work now requires the assignment of some 298,000 American troops. By next July 1, their number will be cut to 171,000, of which 98,000 will be performing the duties of supervising the German government and population, and 73,000 will be performing the direct supply requirements of this force

Source: The US Army Occupation of Germany, 1944 - 1946. (p. 320-321)
On V-E Day, Eisenhower had sixty-one US divisions, 1,622,000 men, in Germany, and a total force in Europe numbering 3,077,000. (WFE: How many were really on German soil, Austria, and "liberated" countries?)

When the shooting ended, the divisions (WFE: and combat support troops assigned to the Armies) became the occupation troops, charged with
* maintaining law and order and
* establishing the Allied military presence in the defeated nation.

This was the army-type occupation.

The blanket occupation form of army-type occupation, a counterpart of the military government carpet, had as its objective the control of the population and the stifling of any resistance by putting troops into every nook and cranny. .... the company was widely viewed as the ideal unit for independent deployment because billets were easy to find and the hauls from the billets to guard posts and checkpoints would not be excessively long.

The occupation troops
* manned border control stations,
* maintained checkpoints at road junctions and bridges,
* sent out roving patrols to apprehend curfew and circulation violators, and
* kept stationary guards at railroad bridges, Army installations, DP camps, jails, telephone exchanges, factories, and banks (In effect, the combat forces became military government security troops.)

Source: American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953.
* restore and maintain (law and ) order
* care of DPs. refugees amd German POWs
* public health
* restoration of public works and utilities
* transportation
* communications

The first important occupation function as combat operations came to an end in any given area was to restore and maintain order among the local civilians. In most cases the regular civil police had been evacuated or were undependable and MG had no forces of their own to be used for the maintenance of order. The tactical commander was thus obliged to create a police force of some type, to secure his own troops and installations (and to support the local MG).

East of the Rhine, it became less necessary for the tactical troops to perform security services. More local (civil) police and other officials were found at their posts, and public and Nazi Perty records were more generally found intact (making it easier and more timely to determine the dependability (clearance by CIC and/or MG Special Br if no Nazi affiliation) of these government officials). Security guards furnished by tactical units kept main supply routes clear of DP's and refugees, posted (MG) proclamations and ordinances, interrogated suspicious individuals. Problems dealing with security (i.e. law and order): Implementing and maintaining SHAEF policy on non-fraternization Controlling the movement of refugees Preventing looting of deserted homes and properties Apprehending violators of MG laws and ordinances Next to the maintenance of security, the major non combat activity of the Theater command in occupied territory prior to the German surrender was the care of (millions of uprooted individuals, including) Displaced Persons, refugees and German Prisoners of War. The primary concern of tactical forces in regards to the refugees and Displaced Persons was to prevent their movement from hindering operations of the armies (= control). However, actual experience indicated that this problem was not as severe as initially feared and soon the concern of the armies shifted in favor of the humanitarian and political aspects of the DP problem. As Allied troops entered Germany, SHAEF determined that tactical troops would be used to staff and administer assembly centers for DP's (= care) and that only at a later stage UNRRA units would assume responsibility for this function. Field commanders began to detail troops (in March) in greater numbers to deal with the DP problem. On April 15, the 12th Army Gp authorized its armies to use combat troops for the care and control of DPs. (The partial declaration of ECLIPSE conditions by the 12th AG at about the same time implied that army commanders could safely divert a part of their manpower to work with DPs. )

Another function that tactical troops initially shared with MG was the responsibility of public health. As it became apparent that there was a lack of German doctors and hospital facilities to care for the civilian population in the occupied areas, tactical medical personnel were made responsible for providing health services to Germans and DPs. Later, the public health staffs of G-5 divisions assumed that function for German civilians, whereas the regular medical staffs of military commands (assisted by MG and UNRRA medical personnel) remained responsible for supervision of the health of DPs and liberated Allied POWs and surviving inmates of concentration camps Allied troops restored public works and utilities to the extent necessary to attain military objectives and to prevent disease and disorder among the civilian population. The MG and Engineer Technical Services shared responsibility for these operations. Tactical units made repairs to support their own operations. Public works and utilities incl: Water supply Electric power Sewage disposal Roads (Railways) Bridges Another field that the armies shared with MG in performing occupation duties was transportation. The Engineers and Military Railway Service were heavily involved in restoring transportation facilities. MG was also involved by supervising the German authorities in restoration operations. The Provost Marshal allotted roads for use as supply lines and other purposes, Army transportation offices, upon request by MG, assisted in the movement of refugees and DPs. Prior to V-E Day, the main activity in the field of transportation was the building up of the military lines of communications (main supply routes). East of the Rhine, where the main highways and many secondary roads were in usable condition except for (demolished) bridges, the tactical troops restored communications by building a number of temporary bridges. Toward the end of hostilities, many highway and railroad bridges west of the Rhine were rebuilt by German civilian labor under military direction. The control of German communications during the combat period was shared by the Army technical services and MG. There was no precise division of authority. The Signal Corps and G-2 agencies promptly seized for military use all interurban communication lines and retained them until after the cessation of hostilities. MG took charge of communication matters of purely local importance. Tactical commanders impounded and guarded mail, provided security of post offices and telephone exchanges and other vital communications facilities. After conditions were stabilized, MG took over control of these facilities. G-2 mobile teams were responsible for verifying that proper measures had been taken by tactical and MG troops to safeguard communications in the occupied areas. Tactical troops and MG units were jointly responsible for locating and preserving monuments, fine arts and archives. Tactical commanders were instructed to prevent the removal of works of art (looting) and objects of scientific and historical value, and to protect German monuments and contents of museums. MG was responsible for staff work in locating and disposing of captured documents in coordination with G-2 staffs of the armies. Although denazification was a primary responsibility of MG, tactical forces, in particular CIC, played an important supporting role.



All units within the ETO were classified into one of four categories:
Category I units were those scheduled to stay in Europe as part of the Army of Occupation;
Category II units were those designated to be redeployed to the Pacific;
Category III units were those being reorganized either for the Pacific or the occupation;
Category IV units were those having only men with 85 or more points and designated for return to the United States.

Occupation Troop Basis can be defined as the military strength of the Army of Occupation required to perform all the mission assigned to it. (WFE) Strategic Reserve can be defined as those forces held on an alert or semi-alert basis for missions of a strategic purpose in event of an emergency. Strategic missions included support to other Allied forces in Europe or employment in major implementation of national policy outside the US occupation zones of Germany and Austria.

Source: Letter to CofS, 15 Aug 45, SUBJECT: Distribution of Occupational Ground Forces in Germany and Austria. (SGS 370) Based on the occupation mission as defined in the letter and on the troop ceiling as defined in JCS 942/5, the security requirements for the suppression of disorder in the U.S. Occupation Zones of Germany and Austria were determined as follows: Western Military District 3 divisions (all infantry) Eastern Military District 4 divisions (2 armored; 1 infantry & 1 airborne) U.S. Forces, Austria 1 division Berlin District 2/3 division Bremen Sub-district 1/3 division The above distribution was to be accomplished by the close of 1945 and completed no later than 1 March 1946. The numerical designation of the above allocated divisions was to be made before 1 Nov 46. The role of the occupational divisions, other than the strategic reserve, would be a static one with emphasis upon occupational duties rather than on maneuvers and field training. Consequently, each of the static divisions would be so distributed that they were divided into regimental concentrations with supporting and service troops near the main administrative and communications centers. The divisions will not be dissipated into battalion and company units in a blanket occupation role. Based on preliminary study, the Strategic Reserve was estimated at two divisions: 1 armored division 1 airborne division The strategic reserve would operate under a Corps hqs and be concentrated in the western portion of the Eastern Military District. They would have occupational duties, but their area of occupation would be considerably reduced.
7th Army Western MD - 3d Inf Div Aug 46 84th Inf Div Jan 46 1st Armd Div May 46
3d Army Eastern MD - 1st Inf Div thru 9th Inf Div Dec 46 71st Inf Div 102d Inf Div Feb 46 4th Armd Div May 46
Berlin District Berlin - 78th Inf Div (-) May 46
Bremen Enclave Bremen - 311th Inf Regt (78th Inf Div) May 46
USFA Vienna - 42nd Inf Div Jun 46 83rd Inf Div
Czech. Pilsen - 80th Inf Div 94th Inf Div

Seventh Army Objectives.
Source: [1] ARMY & NAVY JOURNAL, Jun 29 46, Gen. Eisenhower's Report, p. 1314.

The conquest of the Redoubt area thus remained as an important objective of the Allies, despite the collapse of the rest of GERMANY. In the event of determined resistance, its reduction would constitute a formidable problem, and speed of movement was therefore essential to forestall the enemy's retiring into the area in time to fortify against the Allies' attacks. The 6th Army Group was to devote the whole of its attention to the problem of the Redoubt farther south and west. The Seventh Army, under the 6th Army Group, was to advance along the axis WÜRZBURG-MÜNCHEN, penetrate the mountains, and subsequently to occupy the fortress area.

Final Seventh Army Combat Operations.
Source: [1] ARMY & NAVY JOURNAL, Jun 29 46, Gen. Eisenhower's Report, p. 1314.
The final thrust by the Seventh Army also began on April 22, following the fall of NÜRNBERG two days earlier. On the right flank, XV Corps moved down the DANUBE and then struck south to MÜNCHEN, which was captured, in the face of some opposition, on April 30. The enemy attempted to move an SS Panzer Division to block the Allied advance along the Alpine foothills, but was unsuccessful in checking the Corps progress. On May 4, the 3rd Inf Div of XV Corps cleared BERCHTESGADEN, while other troops occupied SALZBURG, and the entire enemy sector between there and LINZ fell apart. Meanwhile, XXI and VI Corps had crossed the DANUBE in the DILLINGEN area on April 22, and at DONAUWÖRTH 2 days later. Pockets of the enemy created south of the River by the converging advances were eliminated, and AUGSBURG was cleared by XXI Corps on the 28th. Farthest west, the ULM area was reached by VI Corps, which, after a pause occasioned by the moves of the flanking French units, drove on toward the Alpine foothills. The infantry passed through the armor to penetrate the mountains, where the terrain served to slow progress more than did the opposition of the enemy. On May 3, INNSBRUCK was taken, and the 103rd Inf Div of VI Corps pushed on to the BRENNER PASS. At VIPITENO on the Italian side of the border, a junction was affected on May 4 with elements of the 88th Inf Div of Fifth U.S. Army which had struck into the ALPS from the south. The danger of an enemy last stand in the Redoubt was finally eliminated.